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ABSTRACT
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--- Game Theoretic Approach
Hongbin Chen, Master of Science in Civil Engineering, 1989
Thesis directed by:
Charles H. Gould, P.E.
Associate Professor
of Civil and Environmental Engineering
Department of Civil and Environmental
Engineering
A game theoretic approach is applied to analyze
competitive bidding in the construction industry because
previous models do not consider the conflict of interest that
exists among competitors. The game theoretic model improves
corporate performance when compared to previous Bayesian
analyses.
The game theoretic model is discussed in conjunction
with construction contracting practice. Competitive bidding
is formulated as a game theoretic model in which a contractor
optimizes his bid price to maximize his utility or corporate
performance. Using available historical data, order
statistics are employed to access the distribution of
estimated costs among bidders for a project. The winner's
curse problem related to biased estimated cost is also solved
by means of order statistics. An empirical approach is
proposed to define the degree of the winner's curse in a
local market.
A basic model is derived using complex mathematics. This
is followed by a simplified solution that enhances the
understanding and application of game theory in the
construction industry. The simplified model is in a linear
form that makes it practical for use in a business
environment.
The historical bidding data of two contractors engaged
in the construction industry are used to evaluate the
proposed simplified model. The results show that, even in its
linear form, the model improves the contractors' performance
significantly when compared to previous Bayesian analyses.
Future research directions in game theoretic modelling
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Competitive bidding has long been used as method for allocating and procuring
contracts in the construction industry. Especially in the public sectors, it is a legal
requirement to use competitive bidding to award most contracts. With a slowdown
in the global economic growth, firms must take business away from competitors
if they are to sustain their growth rate. Globalization of the market, and rapidly
changing technology are producing new sources of competition. In order to be
successful in the competitive economy some contractors have applied strategies in
the competitive bidding situation.
One of the approaches is to use bidding models to predict the behavior of the
competition. Modeling the competitive bidding was initiated by Friedman [7,8] in
1956. Since then many scholars and practitioners have contributed to this topic.
The bidding models, however, have not been widely used in the construction indus-
try.
A Significance of Research
The critiques' and arguments about the previous competitive bidding models center
on their applicability and calculability. Many studies indicate a number of different
points of view such as winning probability assessment, cost distribution assessment,
1
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and bid value assessment. The current applications and literature in the construc-
tion industry show that Bayesian analysis is an approach employed most frequently
in the competitive bidding modeling, and the game theoretic approach is rarely
discussed.
The Bayesian approach presupposes the existence of a (possibly subjective) prior
probability distribution, and of a gain (loss) function developed through utility
considerations. Given this approach, one is forced, by the nature of utility theory,
to use overall expected gains (loss) in evaluating decision rules. Bayesian decision
theorist, accepting the foundation of subjective probability, do not generally make
a distinction between decisions under risk and decisions under uncertainty.
The game theoretic approach was developed as a decision-making tool to be used
in situations where chance and the user's choice are not the only factors operating.
One additional significant factor considered in game theory is the conflict among the
competitors. In other words, while decision makers are trying to manipulate their
environment, their environment is trying to manipulate them. The competitive
bidding process is a type of game in which the bidders make decisions which take
into account not only the nature of the project (i.e. size, specification and site
condition etc.), but the competitors' possible bid price as well.
The mathematical complexity of most existing bidding models precludes their
application, even though the models themselves are theoretically sound. Any pro-
posed model must not only be realistic enough that it will derive meaningful syn-
thetic data, but it must also be computationally tractable. That is, the model must
be both useful and usable. These two requirements, along with the problems in-
volved in the integration of unique characteristics of construction industry, are the
driving forces behind a new research direction.
To adequately model competitive bidding, it is necessary to rely more and more
on recent advances in the operations research / economics. The game theory has
been used to successfully model the competitors' behavior in other industries such
as the manufacturing industry and the petroleum industry, because its structure
can be set up to be compatible with the real market structure. The use of the
game theoretic approach to model the competition in the construction industry is
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 	 3
certainly feasible and worthy of being explored.
B Plan of Study
The study starts with a review of relevant literature in chapter II. The major models
are selected from the ample literature which is discussed in detail. These models are
Friedman's [8], Gate's [10], Broemser's [4], LOMARK [22], and Carr's [5]. The sig-
nificant innovations of the other's models are also covered. The competitive bidding
literature is reviewed separately; first in the field of operations research/economics,
and then the construction industry.
Prior to a detailed discussion of the game theoretic approach application, the
game theory is introduced as to it's concept, structure, constraints and solutions.
The vital theory for a game theoretic bidding model is discussed more substantially
in chapter III.
The bidding model is proposed based on the n-player game theoretic approach.
The general bidding model is introduced at the first stage of the chapter IV. The
order statistics technique is applied to assess the potential cost distribution among
the bidders in a project. The winner's curse may be an important factor in the com-
petitive bidding. Therefore, the winner's curse coefficient is included in the model
with the purpose of reflecting a more realistic situation. Due to the mathematical
complexity of the general model, a simplified bidding model is developed in a linear
form.
The empirical testing of the proposed bidding model is proceeded by comparing
the results of the proposed model and the actual outcome in the light of same data
set. The data set is divided into two parts. The first part is considered as the
historical data and the balance as the actual outcome.
The bidding game-theoretic model is the most respected simulation of the real
competitive situation. It has not received enough attention in construction industry.
Even in its simplified form it appears to produce better results than the Bayesian
approach. Although simplified game theoretic model is proposed, the possible mod-
ifications and further research directions are suggested in chapter VI.
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This paper is not intended to be a complete methodology for the game theory
application in the competitive bidding, but it is believed that the more realistic
assumption, which reflects the conflict of interests among bidders, is a significant
start for the future exploration. Also, no matter how good a methodology is for a
particular firm, there can be no substitute for people with experience, good judge-
ment, and motivation. If a project team already has such qualifications, then this
methodology should provide a perfect complement.
Chapter II
LITERATURE REVIEW
The subject of competitive bidding strategies crosses many and varied fields of study.
In fact, the subject embraces engineering, economics, statistics, and operations
research. The operations research is a systematic and scientific approach to solving
complex business and organizational problems, and is certainly the most significant
literature to be searched.
The construction industry is a unique industry in the general economy. The
publicly funded sector is one of the major market in the construction industry. The
public sector awards a substantial number of contracts through the mechanism of
publicly advertised competitive bidding. Many contracting firms place their primary
emphasis on competing in this market in order to sustain the stable growth in their
business. The demand for the winning strategies in this environment has promoted
the development of competitive bidding modelling.
Therefore, it is logical to sequentially review the relevant literature in operations
research and the construction industry . The major existing models in the construc-
tion industry are discussed in order to present the state-of-art in this field. The
review of operations research literature is relatively succinct. In 1980,
Engelbrecht-Wiggans found that there were more than five hundred papers dealing with the
auction and bidding models [6].
5
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A Operations Research Literature
The first formal bidding model was developed by Friedman in 1956 [8]. In his
article published in the "Operations Research" he proposed the probabilistic model
to simulate the competitive bidding circumstance. He used the Bayesian analysis
approach although the game theoretic approach was discussed in his subsequently
published doctoral dissertation [7].
1 Friedman's Model
Let P(b) be the probability that a bid of b will be lowest and will win the contract.
Then the expected profit, E(π), if a bid b is made, will be
Where c - estimated cost, s - ratio of true cost to estimated cost, h(s) - distribution
of s, π - profit gained from the contract.
Friedman argues that P(b) is independent of s, and ∫0∞ h(s)ds = 1 , therefore
equation 1 becomes
where c' = c	 sh(s)ds, is called the estimated cost corrected.
In general, E(π) will take on values similar to those shown in Figure 1.
Once the expected profit curve is determined, it is relatively straightforward
procedure to determine the bid that maximizes profit.
The probability of winning is determined from historical data. If the identity of
all the historical competitors and the identity of the competitors participating in
next competition are known then all competitor's bidding pattern may be studied.
The distributions of the ratios of known competitor's cost to contractor's cost are
shown in Figure 2. The winning probability of the subject contractor is shown in
the shaded area. The distribution of s ( competitor's bid to firm's cost ratio ) can
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Point of Maximum Expected Profit
Figure 1: Expected Profit. vs Bid Price
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be predicted as
If it is not known exactly how many competitors will submit bids, the concept
of average bidder is used. The bidding distribution of the average bidder is found
by combining all previous ratios of an opposing bid to the firm's cost estimate to
one distribution function
where k is the number of average bidders. f(r) is the winning bid cost ratio distri-
bution function against an individual average bidder. P(b) is shown in the shaded
area of Figure 3.
If one can determine the probability of k bidders submitting bids and if this
probability is p(k), the probability P(b) of a bid b being the lowest bid becomes
f (r) can be found by fitting a curve to the data available. A gamma distribution
will frequently be a good fit to data of this type.
where α  and β are constants obtained from curve fitting the frequency data of the
gamma distribution.
It is also reasonable to assume that the number of bidders might have a Poison
distribution. That is, if A is the estimated number of bidders then 
Based on the above assumptions, Friedman found the winning probability against
average bidders.
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P(B) = Product of areas to the right of
Figure 2: Winning Probability When Competitors' Identity Known
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F(B)= Area to the right of
Figure 3: Winning Probability When Competitors' Identity Unknown
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2 Broemser's Model
Broemser [4] generalized the value of a bid for a project, given the bid and the
special state of information, S, represented by its total a priori knowledge, as
where M - the gain of the x contractor from a project, Bx - the bid of the contractor,
- the cost of the project, Bw - the winning bid, and S - state of information.
The relationship of actual cost to estimated cost is not taken into considera-
tion, so that he disregards bias and errors in the estimated cost. Normalizing the
foregoing equation by dividing by his contractor's estimated cost, Cx  he has
By setting the derivative of the expected value, given his bidder's bid and its
total a priori knowledge, with the respect to bx equal to zero, and after manipulating
the equation, he arrives at the optimum condition, as follows:
Because P(bx < bw /S) is the right tail of the complementary cumulative proba-
bility distribution of P(bw /S), then
By substituting this in equation 2
therefore
Broemser's model has significant contribution to the subject of winning proba-
bility assessment, as mentioned by Alpert [1]. Broemser determined the probability
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distribution of the lowest competitive bid by setting up a linear regression model
for 76 projects bid by his contractor over a period of about one year. He argues
that the percentage markup on the cost of a competitor is determined by several
readily ascertainable conditions with respect to a particular job. Each of these con-
ditions or variables, after weighting would affect a competitor's markup percentage
applied to his estimated cost of a project. Broemser assumed that each competitor
assigned the same weight to the same characteristics for any project he proposed
to bid. Therefore, each competitor's percentage markup on cost is the sum of the
products of each condition or variable and the related weight. Consequently the
lowest bid on any job is
where gwi is i th weight used by the lowest competitor for its i th variables,xwi 1,2,...,k
By allowing gw 0 and xw0 each to be equal 1, the equation becomes
If the ratio of the lowest competitor's cost to the subject bidder's cost is cw (a
random variable), then Cw=cwCz.Substitutingxfor Cin preced  equation
and dividing throughout by Cx , the result is
When βwi is set equal to cwgwi, he has in regression form,
In his model the dependant variable is the ratio of the bid of the lowest com-
petitor to his contractor's estimated cost, and the parameters are considered to be
the product of the applicable weight that the lowest competitor attaches to each of
the independent variables and the ratio of the lowest competitor's estimated cost
to subject contractor's estimated cost. The first term of the multiple regression,
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βw0 Xw0, or cwgw0xw0, is simply the ratio of the lowest bidder's estimated cost to
the subject bidder's estimated cost, since gw0 and xw0 have each been set equal to
1. The other variables are factors such as percentage of estimated cost not sub-
contracted, estimated project duration, and estimated project duration divided by
estimated cost.
These variables may be used one or more times by raising them to different
powers to reflect their effects on the bid if it is determined that the effect is not
linear.
Broemser next proceeded to apply his model to 76 projects. He found it conve-
nient to try succeedingly larger values of bxuntilE(m/b)in his nor al zed general
equation reaches a maximum. The optimum normalized bid indicates a markup of
4.64% on his contractor's cost estimate and a probability of winning of 0.317.
He then compasses this model with one from which all the independent variables
except x w0 are omitted and recommends the more complicated model because it
would have result in a 18% increase in his contractor's profit comparable to the
simple model. In this simple model, only costs are considered, i.e. bw  = kcw, where
k is a constant determined by the regression.
3 Game Theoretic Models
The essence of competition is interdependence and conflicts of interest among the
interdependent firms. Game theory is the dominant conceptual paradigm employed
in operations research for the modeling of competitive bidding since it deals with
the methodical solution to conflicts.
Game theoretic models rely on a set of assumptions about the behavior of com-
peting firms and information available to them. On the basis of these assumptions,
the bids submitted by firms in competitive bidding and the bidding outcomes (profit,
market share, etc.) are derived analytically based on a state of equilibrium among
the bidders. Equilibrium is defined as a list of strategies, one for each firm, with
the property that no firm would like to unilaterally change its strategy.
Noncooperative game theory seeks to predict the behavior of rational, intelligent
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firms competing independently [16]. Both "rationality" and "intelligence" have spe-
cial meaning in this theory. Firms are rational if they make decisions by maximizing
their subjective expected "utility". Firms are intelligent if they recognize that other
firms are rational.
Among the vast amount of work dealing with the game theory application in
competitive bidding, Ortega-Reichert's research is the most extensive and complete
[18].
In the operations research field the game theoretic model was developed for an
auction, that is a competition where the highest bid wins . The general auction





v i - lowest possible valuation in an auction
vi - valuation of i t h participant on the auction object
n - the number of participants
F(.) -the cumulative distribution function of the other
participants' valuation on the object
from the i t h participant point of view.
Two assumptions were made for this model:
(1) The participants are rational and have the same objective function
(2) The participants' valuation are distributed identically and
independently
The game theoretic models are usually in more complex forms than the Bayesian
bidding model. Perhaps this is one reason why these models have had little use as
tools to aid top management in the industry.
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Construction Industry Literature
William R. Park is credited as being the pioneer who introduced the formal compet-
itive bidding model to the construction industry [19]. His book , "The Strategy of
Contracting for Profit", published in 1966, is an extensive study of the competitive
bidding process in the industry. The basic approach he proposes for solving the
decision-making problem in competitive bidding circumstances are mostly adapted
from Friedman's model.
Following Park's book, scholars and practitioners have contributed significantly
to this subject. The significant and innovative models developed since 1966 have
been the Gates's model [10], the LOMARK model [22] and Carr's model [5].
All the above mentioned models have as their basis the Bayesian theory and are
based on the same assumption that the firms are maximizing the expected profit,
which is the basic object function of Friedman's model.
where E(π ) is expected value
P(b) is the probability of winning a bid
π is the profit generated from the project if the contractor win the bid
The innovation of the different models is found in the means for assessing the
winning probability.
1 Gates's Model
The significant aspect of Gates's model lies in the assessment of the winning prob-
ability [10].
In case where many bidders are involved, Gates presented a general relationship
where t is any order number of the project which is listed ascending order based
on the ratio of competitor's bid to contractor's bid, and T is the greatest order
number.
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If all the identities of the competitors are known to the contractor, and the
historical winning probability distributions are available, then
where Pi (b) (i = 1,2, ...,n) is the winning probability of the contractor over the ith
competitor.
When the number of competitors can be predicted with confidence but their
identities are unknown, the above formula can be simplified by assuming that the
probability of winning over each competitor is the same, then
in which Pavg (b) is the probability of winning over the "average competitors" , and
n is the total number of competitors
2 LOMARK Model
LOMARK model was proposed by Wade and Harris in 1976 [22]. The model rep-
resented a new approach , which is a simple and inexpensive method for a small to
medium-sized contractor to assess his competition and relate his assessment to his
future bidding strategies.
The essence of the model is that only major competitors in the local market are
considered in the probability of winning assessment. The winning probability is the
product of the probability that the contractor's empirical winning probability over
the major competitors, and the probability that the anticipated competitors will
submit bids.
P(BC0 < LBC / X ,Y, Z) = P(BC0 < LBC)P(X,Y, Z) (7)
where BC° - ratio of contractor's bid to it's estimated cost; LBC - lowest ratio of
bid to contractor's estimated cost, among the competitors X , Y and Z; P(X,Y, Z)
-probability that X, Y and Z will submit the bids.
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The P(BC0 < L BC) is determined by the historical data using an approach
similar to Gates's, i.e.
where t is any order number of the project which is listed descending based on the
magnitude of the ratio between competitor's bid and contractor's bid, and T is the
greatest order number [11].
The probability that the major competitors will bid the future job is subject to
the contractor's own ad-hoc judgement based on the available information.
3 Carr's Model
Carr generalized a competitive bidding model so that it would not be limited by the
assumptions on which Friedman's and Gates's models depend [5]. It is applicable
to the situation in which a contractor's cost and competitor's bid distribution can
be estimated.
If contractor i has a standardized cost (i.e. the ratio of the estimated cost to the
mean of a group of estimated costs for a project) on project k of C'ik , the probability
that (Bj/Ci)jk(ie.Bj/Ci)kwill exc ed a value b is given by
where
f(.) is the distribution function of bid cost ratio or standardized cost.
The probability that (B/C)ijk will exceed b when the value of C' ik is not known is
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If more than one competitor is involved, a contractor's bid must be lower than
the lowest competing bid in order to win a project. The probability that the lowest
(B/C)ijk  of nk competitor j in project k will be described by
Against nk competitors who can all be described by the same distribution, then
in which Ba is standardized bid of an average competitor.
C Review Summary
A review of the construction industry literature shows that the game theoretic
bidding model has not been used. Some of the proposed Bayesian expected value
models seem too complex to be applied in the daily practise. On the other hand,
the simplifying assumptions required to make them usable in practise generates
unsatisfactory results in some models.
In contrast to the construction industry literature, the game theory has played
an important role in the modelling of competitive bidding. A model may serve
one of two major purposes: either descriptive, for explaining and/or understanding;
or prescriptive, by predicting and/or duplicating behavioral characteristics. The
bidding models used in operations research literature usually fall in the category of
descriptive, which is not useful in direct application.
More and more intensive competition in the construction industry forces firms to
compete rationally by means of optimized strategies in order to keep their positions
in the market. The demand for a better model becomes more and more serious.
The "goodness" of a model depends on its approximation and calculability.
The more realistic the assumptions in a model, the more closer approximation
the result. The Bayesian approach has a major weakness in that it ignores the
matter of conflict among competitors. The seemingly realistic nature of competitive
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reactions and the solution concepts used in game theory has lead to the need of study
in the application of game theoretic model in construction industry.
Applicability is an important factor in modelling. A differential function (equa-
tion 4) in the existing game solution of the bidding models prevents practitioners
from utilizing the theoretically sound models. The conflicting aspects of approxi-
mation and applicability must be traded off.
Chapter III
GAME THEORY
More recently the social and behavioral sciences have been making great progress
in developing mathematical description of human behavior, by replacing or supple-
menting the pure verbal descriptions with more precise mathematical ones. This
effort goes on over a broad range of interests, but one area in particular is business
decision-making. How do, or how should, people choose among alternative courses
of action? There are many different mathematical formulations which deal with
different aspects of this problem. One approach has led to a mathematical theory
of fundamental importance — the game theory. Its particular concern is with certain
activity in which several people participate, each having some power of choice that
would affect the outcomes of activity, and each having somewhat conflicting de-
sires for the outcomes of the activity. The decision-making problem in competitive
bidding is a perfect application for game theory.
The game theory became a serious mathematical tool for examining certain
aspects of human behavior in 1944 with the publication of "Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior" by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern [21]. The
theory has made substantial contributions to the social and behavioral sciences by
providing a conceptual framework for viewing decision-making in the presence of
conflict of interest.
There is a simple example indicating the distinction between the game theory
and the Bayesian theory. When trying to forecast the weather, one would make
19
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statistical analysis on the available historical weather data to obtain the distribu-
tion of the possible outcomes. It is certain that nature never acts against human
intentionally. This is the Bayesian theory application in which no conflict is present.
If, however, one were in competitive bidding situation, the participants have their
own interests, which are very often conflicting . Each participant has to take into
account the opponents' possible courses of action in their decision-making in order
to be successful in the competition. Game theory considers the conflict and is the
appropriate model of competitive bidding.
To fully understand game theory would require a thorough grounding in higher
mathematics. A sense of what is involved, however, can be illustrated with simple
mathematics. This understanding can throw a much more informed light on how
to go about making the "right" decision with help from the game theoretic bidding
model.
The basic concepts in the formation of a bidding model are: Players; Objects;
Payoff function; and Strategies [6]. These elements are subsequently described. In
the discussion the terms "known", "identical", and "symmetric" have special mean-
ings. The values are " known" if there is no uncertainty about them. The values
would be "identical" if they are all equal to the single outcome of the random vari-
able and "symmetric" if they are equal to the outcomes of independent identically
distributed random variables.
A Players
A player, or strategic bidder, is anyone whose bidding strategy is unspecified by
the model. In a competitive bidding game, there may one or more contractors that
are considered a player. The number of participants or players in each contract
bidding may be known or unknown. If it is unknown, the number of prospective
participants can be considered as a random number drawn from a population. Fried-
man suggested that the bidder number distribution fits a Poison distribution [8].
In the construction industry the number of the bidders is usually known prior to
submitting a bid.
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Each contractor has his own interest in a project. In other words, every player
is assumed to have a cardinal utility function which is linear or nonlinear. The
attitude of a contractor toward the risk associated with the performing a project,
if he wins it, is the dominant factor in the assumption and formation of the utility
function. The assumption that the object of all bidders is to maximize expected
profit is the most popular due to its linear form of function.
B Objects
A contractor may face one, or more than one project, available for bidding at a
point in time. If a model is developed for considering more than one project, it is
called a multiple project model. On the other hand, the contractor may consider
the available projects one at a time over a period of time. This requires sequential
modelling in order to consider the interdependence of the sequential bidding activity.
Multiple and sequential modelling usually generates complex models.
The true state of nature is the combination of the characteristics of a project.
The characteristics of a project can be known or uncertain. The gross floor area
of a building is known to all bidders, but the geological condition of the site is
uncertain due to the fact that each bidder has different access to and perception of
the available information. One bidder may perform his own subsurface investigation
in order to obtain more accurate geological state but the other bidders may just
make the judgements based on only the subsurface data provided by the owner.
A project cost is the true state of a project. The estimated cost can be con-
sidered as a random number drawn from a probability population which is the
pool population consisting of a number of random variables such as materials price,
geological condition and project duration etc. McCaffer made an extensive statis-
tical analysis, on hundreds of building and road contract bidding data and came up
with the result that the distribution of bids very closely approximates the normal
distribution [15].
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C Payoff Function
The payoff function of a game determines who gets what on the basis of the strategies
chosen by the players and the true state of nature. In competitive bidding the payoff
function can be different among the bidders. Fundamental to any analysis of correct
bidding strategy must be a clear understanding of the objectives of all competitors.
As a first approximation, it is generally assumed that firms attempt to maximize
profits. The simple and popular payoff function is the profit gained which is the
difference between the bid and the true cost, if the bid is the lowest one.
Gain = Bid — Cost
The profit maximization assumption has limitations. One limitation is that the
making of profits requires time and energy, and if the owners of the firm are the
managers as well, they may decide that it is preferable to sacrifice profits for leisure.
Other limitation may be resources such as capital or trained personnel. In a case
of this sort, it is more accurate to assume that the firm is maximizing a utility.
Generally speaking, the utility payoff function requires more complex study and
more information.
The market share is also a vital payoff to a firm in the business world. The
market share can be applied in the sequential bidding model in which the firm is
trying to maximize the total number of won projects in a period of time.
The another alternative payoff function is related to the spread of bid, which
is the difference between the low bid and the second low bid [19]. Several reasons
make it significant:
• the spread indicates, to some extent, the intensity of competition for a project
• the spread measures the amount of money left "on the table", and tells how
much higher the low bidder could have been and still have won the project
• a wide spread is probably the indication of an estimating error on the low
bidder's part, especially if the second and higher bids are grouped closely
together.
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The spread of a bid is considered a real loss to the winner of the competition.
In this case the payoff function is the profit minus the spread of bid.
Gain = Profit — Spread of Bid
D Strategies
A pure strategy for a firm is a plan of action [16]. It specifies what the firm will do
as a function of what the firm knows. A mixed strategy is a probability distribution
on the firm's feasible set of pure strategies. In other words, by choosing a mixed
strategy a firm is really choosing a randomization device and the strategy played
will depend on the outcome of the randomization.
A mixed strategy appears not to be acceptable to industry since no firm would
make decisions as the result of randomization.
A firm may be assumed to select their bidding strategy according to any one of a
number of criteria. In min-max models, each firm chooses a strategy which maximize
the minimum possible utility of the final outcome over all possible combinations of
bidding strategies of the remaining opponent firm, However easy to calculate, such
strategies appear to have little practical use [6].
Nash equilibrium is the central concept of the most multi-bidder models. Strate-
gies are in equilibrium if each firm uses a strategy which, for the particular strategies
used by the remaining firms, maximizes the utility of outcome. Equilibrium is a
list of strategies (pure or mixed), one for each firm, with the property that no firm
would like to unilaterally change its strategy. Nash equilibrium is the solution to
the noncooperative game with the assumptions that all the firms are rational and
intelligent [17]. "Noncooperative" means that all the firms act independently and




In the contract bidding process the project cost is a variable for the different bidders
because the individual bidder has different access to the information about the
project condition and has a different cost function in term of the project scope. All
bidders know their own costs, but not their opponents'.
The potential estimated costs for a prospective project can be considered as a
random sample drawn from a cost population. Since bid rigging is illegal , collusion
is unlikely to occur. Furthermore, the intensive competition in the contract market
prevents the exchange of bidding information from competitors. Therefore, it is
reasonable to assume the individual bidder's estimated cost is independent with
respect to the other bidders.
The characteristics of a cost population are determined by several factors such as
project and market. The project factors include the type, size, and scope features.
The market factors are subject to the location, competitors and time period, etc.
In general, similar projects in the same markets will have the same cost population.
Based upon the historical data, a firm can estimate the parameters of the po-
tential cost population for an upcoming project. The order statistics would be the
proper tool for the historical cost data analysis in a competitive bidding situation.
24
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A Order Statistics
Order statistics is a branch of statistics, which is employed for the analysis of the
property of the extreme of random variables [2,12,9,13]
When the values of a sequence x 1 , x 2, 	of random variables are arranged in
an increasing order x 1;n ≤  x 2;n  ≤...≤  xn;n of magnitude, then the r th member xr;n
of this new sequence is called the rtI order statistic of the x j ,1 < j < n. The two
terms x i;n = min (x1,x2,..., xn) and xn;n= max(x i , x 2 , ..., xn) are called extremes.
Assume x1 , x 2 , ..., xn are independent and identically distributed (i.e. random
samples are from the same population) . The common distribution function is
denoted by F (x) = P (xj< x).
If the common distribution has a location parameter µ(or in engineering terms,
project parameter), and a spread parameter σ(or in engineering terms, market pa-
rameter), the expected value of r th order statistic,
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F(t)n-r dF(t). Values may be calculated by using a computer program or obtained
from the order statistics tables in which appear some statistics handbooks [13] (see
Appendix G).
In particular, the expected value of the minimum order statistic
B Cost Distribution
If a project has a real cost, p, which is the value of a function of the project factors
and market factors, then the ith(i = 1, 2, ..., n) bidder's estimated cost is a random
number ci (i = 1,2, ..., n) drawn from a cost population with location(project) pa-
rameter µ and spread parameter a. The spread(market) parameter a indicates the
variance of the bidders' access to information about the project and the dispersion
of the bidders' cost function, etc. Therefore, a is a market-specific and project-
specific factor. Similar projects in the same type of market would have the same
spread parameter a.
As part of determining an optimal bidding strategy, it is necessary to know
the cost distribution of a population of bidders, and that requires estimating the
location parameter and the spread parameter. In competitive bidding, the most
frequently available historical bidding information is the lowest bid (winning bid)
and the number of bidders. The order statistics can be applied to estimate the pop-
ulation parameters(i.e. location and spread parameters) based upon the available
information of extreme value and the size of population.
Projects may have similar distributions of potential bids, thus having the same
spread parameter, but they may have different location parameters. For example, a
two-story office building and a four-story office building project may be considered as
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similar since they would attract same group of contractors in the market to submit
the bids. It is reasonable to assume that the population's spread parameters of
these two projects are same because the bids are from the same group of bidders,
however, the location parameters (real costs of the projects) are obviously not same.
If there is historical bidding data available, it is possible to group the data based
on the characteristics of the projects and form several different bidder populations.
The bids from one bidder population would be expected to have same spread pa-
rameter since the physical and behavioral differences among the bidders are nearly
the same. The grouping criteria may be the features of the projects, such as the
gross floor area , order of magnitude , type of construction, bid price, etc. The crite-
ria are subject to the manager's ad-hoc judgement and depends on the information
available for identifying project features.
Based on the grouped historical data, it is possible to estimate the future ex-
pected lowest bid. Similar to Broemser's regression model (equation 3), the regres-
sion formula may be
where
b1in — -- the lowest bid (winning bid in a project with n bidders)
c0 — — — the subject firm's own estimated costβi
βi— — — — the regression coefficient ( the weight to the ith feature of a project)
x i — — — the i th feature of a project
ϵi - - - - regression variance on ith feature
Applying the least square regression method on equation 15, the expected lowest
bid E(b1,n) and the variance of the lowest bid Var(b1,n) can be obtained.
From equation 14, the variance of the first order statistic is
Similar to the E(Z1;n), the value of Var(Z1;n) depends only on the form of a
distribution (e.g. standard normal), and the sample size n. Assuming that the bid
distribution is normal [15], the variance of standard normal variable Var(Z 1;n ) is
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available in the statistics handbook [13] (see Appendix G). Given the regression
result of Var(b1;n) , and tabulated Var(Z1;n ); substituting into the equation 16,
then
Further, by assuming that the bid price to estimate cost relationship is linear,
then the standard deviation of the cost, (spread parameter), is equal to the
standard deviation of the bid, σb.
C Game Theoretic Bidding Model
In a competitive bidding game an individual competitor's action is influenced by
the other competitors' action [14]. Assuming the objective of all competitors is
to maximize the expected profit gained from the project, then a Nash equilibrium
for this game is found as follows [14]. Consider the decision of bidder i , whose
estimated cost is c i . He assumes that the other bidders are following a decision rule
given by a bidding function B(.) : that is , he predicts that any other bidder j will
bid an amount B(cj ) if his estimated cost is cj (although bidder i does not know
his competitor's estimated cost). Assume that B(.) is a monotonously increasing
function(i.e. higher estimated cost, higher bid price). If bidder i bids an amount
bi and wins, he earns a profit of b i c i . The probability that all of the other
bidders (n — 1) have estimated costs c j (j = 1,2, ..., n. j ≠  i) such that B(cj ) > b i ;
this probability is {1 — F[B-1(bi )])n-11, based upon the order statistics equation
11, where, as before, F(.) represents the distribution of estimated costs. Bidder i
chooses his bid b i to maximize his expected profit:
Thus he chooses b i such that  = 0, which is the extreme condition. By
differentiating πi with respect to c i , we obtain
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Therefor, by differentiating equation 18, an optimally chosen bid b i must satisfy
In this game setting, it is assumed all bidders act rationally, in other words, use
the same decision rule, such as maximizing the expected profits. Therefore, any two
bidders with the same estimated cost will submit the same bid, in mathematical
terms, bi = B(ci), at Nash equilibrium. By substituting this Nash condition into
equation 19, bidder i's expected profit at a Nash equilibrium is defined as
Solving the differential equation 20 for 71 by integration (use the boundary con-
dition, that a. bidder has the lowest possible estimated cost c i 	0), and substituting
πi in equation 18, and the Nash condition bi 	B(ci), each bidder's decision rule is
determined to be
Note that ∫0c  [1 — F(t)] n-1 dt < 0, because [1 — F(t)]n-1 is a monotonously de-
creasing function. Therefore, the last part  of equation 21 is
the amount which bidder i markups his estimated cost c i.
From calculus, the following is established.
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From the above equation
Substitute equation 22 into equation 21 to obtain the most important and sig-
nificant equation:
D Winner's Curse
In a competitive bidding environment a bidder may have a biased estimate of project
cost. If a bidder has a biased estimated cost that is lower than all other bidders'
estimated costs, then it is likely that he will win the bid consistent with the decision
rule condition:b i = B(c i ), at Nash equilibrium. This is an unexpected and undesir-
able situation from the bidder's point of view, because the project would result in
a loss . This phenomenon is defined as the winner's curse.
winner's curse exists in reality depends on many factors
market, project, and point in time. The degree of the
winner's curse varies, too.
In order to preclude the winner's curse from the bidding decision, a bidder should
use a statistical methodology such as order statistics to adjust the initial estimated
cost.
From order statistics equations 13 and 14 we have
Assuming that the winner's cost adjustment function C adj(c1:n)=c1;n + Δ then
he can eliminate the winner's curse by adjusting the expected value of the adjusted
estimated cost E[Cadi (c iin )] = 1a [20], the actual cost of the project. Thus,
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When A = — σE(Z1; n ), the E[Cadj (c 1;n )] ==µ . Therefore the estimated cost
adjustment function for all bidders is
Note that c i = c1;n  if bidder i wins the project.
The condition described above is for when a perfect winner's curse exists. In
reality, it is unlikely that it will occur universally since many bidders are aware of
the winner's curse and try to avoid it. In recognizing this situation a coefficient
α (α  = [0, 1]) is used to modify the estimated cost function (equation 24).
a is an empirical modification factor that indicates the extent of winner's curse
in a industry, market and type of project etc.. When a = 1, the perfect winner's
curse exists. When a = 0, no winner's curse exists.
Substituting equation 25 into the equation 23, the bidding strategy subject to
winner's curse is
where
B(c i ) — — — — the strategy function (decision rule) with respect to estimated
cost
B'(ci) — — — — the derivative of the strategy function
ci — — — — the estimated cost of i th bidder
F(.) — — — the common cumulative distribution of the estimated costs
f(.) —  — the common density function of the estimated costs
n — — — — number of bidders
σ — — — — the standard deviation of the estimated cost distribution
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E(Z1; n ) — — — the expected value of the standardized variable. If it is standard
normal then it can be obtained from the available order statistic table [13] (see
Appendix G).
σ  — — — — the degree of winner's curse. It can be determined by empirical study.
E Simplified Bidding Strategy
In order to apply the game theoretic strategy that has been developed in the last
sections, the mathematical model is simplified by removing the differential equation
of the optimal bid(equation 26). The simplification is aimed at developing a linear
form of the bidding model.
The decision rule B(c i ) is linear, if B'(ci) = 1. Therefore, from equation 26
For the purpose of simplification, the common cost distribution function of a
potential bidder population may be considered to be normally distributed with a
location parameter, µ , and a spread parameter, σ , [15].
where G(.) and g(.) are the distribution function and density function of the
standard normal distribution, respectively.
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Since bidder i tries his best to estimate the project cost ci , it is reasonable to
make an assumption that c i = µ [20]. Therefore,
Substituting equations 29 and 30 into the linear optimal strategy equation 27,
results in :
This is the simplified linear bidding strategy under the assumption that the
potential cost distribution is normal.
A corresponding formula may be derived for different forms of the cost distri-
bution, such as lognormal distribution, left side truncated normal distribution, etc.
Chapter V
MODEL EVALUATION
`In this chapter the simplified bidding model developed in chapter 4 is tested using
the actual bidding data from two contractors. A flow chart for processing model
information is presented. The model is then applied using two sets of data . The
results of processing the data are measured in terms of profit (P), dollar volume
of projects won(Vw) and the ratio of profit to volume won (P/Vw) are compared to
actual outcomes involving the same data . The model is tested to determined the
increase of the contractors' wealth if it were used.
A Framework of Information Processing
Contracting firms can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of bid preparation
by adopting a systematic approach to bid preparation. As part of a systematic
approach, they can use the above mentioned bidding model to improve their perfor-
mance in such areas as profitability, market share and rate of return etc.. A general
procedure for preparing competitive bids is outlined in Figure 4. The segments of
the model are presented in Figure 5 and Figure 6.
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GLOSSARY:
INFORMATION: Information available
such as features of project,
competitors' identities and
own goals for this project.
HISTORICAL DATA: The bidding data collected
from previous projects, including
own estimated costs, low bids,
and bidders' information
MODEL SEGMENT 1: "Empirical Study on the Historical
Data", The outcomes includes
relationship between own estimated
cost and low bid, variance of possible
low bid, winner's curse degree etc.
MODEL SEGMENT 2: "Optimization of Prospective Bid",
based on the simplified game
theoretic approach, the input
from model segment 1 and the information,
compute the optimal bid.
Figure 4: Flow Chart of the Bidding Model
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GLOSSARY:
Cost Ranges: cost ranges in that the variances of
the low bids are considered the sane
Cij: 	 i = 1, 2, ... 	 k; j= I, 2
the lower bounds and upper bounds
of the cost ranges
k: number of the cost ranges
LB: low bid (winning bid)
CO: firm's estimated cost
a, b: coefficient of regression analysis








Figure 5: Model Segment 1
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MODEL SEGMENT 2
Optimization of Prospective Bid
GLOSSARY:
STD(COST): standard deviation of the estimated
costs among the potential bidders
VAR(LB): 	 variance of the low bid in a specific
cost range
VAR(Z1;N): variance of first order statistic
of standard normal distribution
B     :	optimal bid
CO          :	 firm's estimated cost
n: 	 number of bidders
	 winner's curse coefficient
37
Figure 6: Model Segment 2
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B Evaluation. Methodology
The bidding data are collected from two sources. One set of data is obtained from
Benjamin's PhD dissertation [3]. The another set of data is from Broemser's PhD
dissertation [4]. Both sets of data were collected from two different construction
contractors in California in the period of 1965 - 1968. These data were used because
of the difficulty of obtaining historical cost data from contractors or from private
owners. A portion of the data is used to evaluate the model proposed in this thesis.
Most contractors in the competitive bidding market keep their cost data from the
public to sustain competitiveness. A secondary benefit of reusing existing data is
that the model proposed in this thesis can be compared to some existing models
that are based on the same data.
The computations for the model are performed in a microcomputer using Lotus
1-2-3. The order statistic value of a standard normal distribution are obtained from
Krishnaiah's book [13], see appendix G.
Three performance measures are evaluated; profit(P), volume won(V w ) and ratio
of profit to volume won(P/Vw ). Generally speaking, the profit and P/Vw  ratio are
expected to be as high as possible, but the optimal level of won volume is governed
by the contractor's capacity(resources) and desires. Extremely small and large
values of won volume are not usually expected or accepted.
C Benjamin's Data Set
There are 130 construction projects in Benjamin's data set. The project bids range
of $10,000 to $2,500,000 [3]. The data is reprinted in Appendix C. To evaluate the
proposed model the 130 projects is separated into two groups. Projects 1 through 66
are treated as historical data, and 67 through 130 are viewed as upcoming projects
to be bid. The cost variance among the bids on the same project depends on the
scale of the estimated costs. The higher the estimated cost, the larger the variance,
because there are more or larger cost items involved. Every project has a unique
estimated cost variance. However, the variances among a specific range of bids can
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be considered to be the same for the purpose of simplification in calculation and
tractability in the data collection. In the light of this assumption, the bid ranges,
among which the cost variance is considered to be the same, are defined as:
• $0 - $100,000
• $100,000 - $500,000
• $500,000 - $1,000,000
• $1,000,000 - Up
Based on equation 32, the results of the least square regression analysis for
each range of data for projects 1 through 66 are shown in Table 1. Details of the
regression analysis are developed in Appendix D.
LB = aC0 b 	 (32)
where LB — the lowest bid price, which is assumed to be the winning bid, Co
—contractor's estimated cost.
Table 1: Results of Regression Analysis on Historical Data(Projects 1-66)
Cost Range (1,000)
$0-$100 $100-$500 $500-$1,000 $1,000-Up
Standard Deviation σLB 2.69 9.80 28.31 60.16
Coefficient a .95 1.00 0.96 0.98
Standard Deviation σa 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.18
Constant b 1.85 1.86 22.60 14.88
r Square  0.99 0.99 0.96 0.78
No. of Observations 13 29 14 10
As proved in Chapter IV, the cost variance among the potential bidders are
equal to the bid variance under the assumption that there is a linear relationship
between bid price and estimated cost. Using the order statistics theory, the bid
variance is computed as
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where Var(Z1;n ) is tabulated from Appendix G.
For example, a contractor has a cost estimate of C o = $303, 300 on a project,
and knows that there will be 6 bidders (including itself). From Table 1, of = 9.80.
From Appendix G, the Var(Z1;6) = 0.4159. Accordingly, from equation 33 and the
assumption of linearity, then, the standard deviation of estimated costs is
The proposed simplified bidding model, equation 31, is then applied to determine
the optimal bid price which will maximize the expected profit. By assuming a
winner's curse coefficient a = 0.5, knowing the estimated cost C o = $303,300,
standard cost deviation o-, = 15.2, number of bidders n = 6, and tabulated value of
E(2 1 ; 6 ) = -1.2672 from Appendix G, the optimal bid price is
The winner's curse coefficient a is determined empirically from historical data
of projects 1 through 66. Applying the proposed simplified bidding model (equation
31) with iteration values of a = 0, 0.1, 0.2, ..., 1.0 respectively to these projects
results in the data shown in Table 2:
The curves in the figures 7,8 and 9 indicate the patterns of the total profit,
volume won and ratio of profit to volume won. As the winner's curse coefficient
a increases, the won volume decreases and the ratio of profit to volume increases.
This is an expected phenomenon, since the higher the winner's curse, the more
cautious the bidder is. The result is that the markup on estimated cost rises to
defend against the winner's curse.
To determine the optimal strategy, one should not only consider the total profit,
but the projects scope and the rate of return as well. The weighting method which
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ANALYSIS OF WINNER'S CURSE COEFFICIENT: ALPHA
( DATA SET : PROJECTS # 1 - 66 )
ALPHA GAINED
PROFIT
UTILITY 	 WON 	 P/VwRATIO UTILITY UTILITY
W(P) 	 VOLUME 	 ( % ) 	 W(P/Vw) 	 W
0.0 159.04 0.15 	 9646 	 1.65 	 0.03 0.18
0.1 115.03 0.11 	 5471 	 2.10 	 0.03 0.14
0.2 138.86 0.13 	 4807 	 2.89 	 0.05 0.18
0.3 137.46 0.13 	 3710 	 3.71 	 0.06 0.19
0.4 132.17 0.13 	 2753 	 4.80 	 0.08 0.20
0.5 99.83 0.10 	 1779 	 5.61 	 0.09 0.19
0.6 113.93 0.11 	 1779 	 6.41 	 0.10 0.21
0.7 56.43 0.05 	 982 	 5.74 	 0.09 0.15
0.8 39.42 0.04 	 553 	 7.13 	 0.11 0.15
0.9 22.32 0.02 	 208 	 10.74 	 0.17 0.19
1.0 24.44 0.02 	 208 	 11.75 	 0.19 0.21
SUM: 1038.93 1 	 62.53 	 1
NOTE: ALPHA: WINNER'S CURSE COEFFICIENT
P: GAINED PROFITS
Vw: WON VOLUME
P/Vw: RATIO OF PROFIT TO WON VOLUME
W(P): UTILITY WEIGHT OF PROFIT
= PROFIT/SUM OF PROFIT
W(P/Vw): UTILITY WEIGHT OF P/Vw RATIO
=[ 	 (P/Vw) 	 RATIO ]/[ SUM OF (P/Vw) RATIO ]
W:. UTILITY FACTOR
= W(P) + W(P/Vw)
Table 2: Analysis of Winner's Curse Coefficient: α (Projects 1-66)
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ALPHA(WINNER'S CURSE) VS GAINED PROFIT
Figure 7: α  (Winner's Curse) vs Gained Profit(Projects 1-66)
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ALPHA (WINNER'S (CURSE) VS VOLUME WON
Figure 8: α  (Winner's Curse) vs Won Volume(Projects 1-66)
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ALPHA (WINNER'S CURSE) VS P/V RATIO
Figure 9: α  (Winner's Curse) vs P/Vw Ratio(Projects 1-66)
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defines the contractor's utility as the sum of the weight factors of volume and P/V
ratio in Table 2 is used to evaluate a strategy. The results are shown in Figure
10. It is obvious that the winner's curse coefficient a = 0.5 is the point where the
contractor's utility curve reaches its crown.
Based upon previous analysis of historical data the model is applied to a series
of future projects 67 through 130, which produces the values shown in Table 3. For
detailed computation process see Appendix D.
Table 3: Comparison of Corporate Performances(Benjamin's Data)











No. of Jobs Won 8 7 12 10
Total Profit $82,540 $99,830 $213,960 $205,350
Total Volume Won $2,039,700 $1,778,700 $4,210,100 $3,820,700
Ratio of P/Vw (%) 4.05 5.61 5.08 5.37
/
From the above results it appears that the model behaves reasonably and pro-
duces better performance than the original performance of the contractor.
If using different a values (winner's curse coefficient), the model outcomes based
on the inputs of this set of data (projects 67 - 130) is listed in table 4. Graphing
the profits vs a produces Figure 11. It appears that a = 0.5 is also the point
corresponding to the maximum profits, which verifies the prior assumption that the
a = 0.5 in this market.
D Broemser's Data Set
In order to further test the model, another set of data which is adapted from
Broemser's PhD dissertation [4] is used (see Appendix E). There are 76 projects in
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ALPHA WINNERS CURSE VS W  (UTILIY)
ALPHA WINNER'S CURSE COEFFICIENT
Figure 10: α  (Winner's Curse) vs Utility(Projects 1-66)
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ANALYSIS OF WINNER'S CURSE COEFFICIENT: ALPHA
( DATA SET : PROJECTS # 67 - 130 )
ALPHA GAINED
PROFIT
UTILITY 	 wpm 	 P/VwRATIO UTILITY UTILITY
W(P) 	 VOLUME 	 ( %) 	 W(P/Vw) 	 W
0.0 122.74 0.09 	 8334 	 1.53	 0.03 0.12
0.1 157.61 0.11 	 6525 	 2.42 	 0.05 0.16
0.2 143.43 0.10 	 4436 	 3.23 	 0.06 0.17
0.3 164.75 0.12 	 4105 	 4.01 	 0.08 0.20
0.4 177.53 0.13 	 3821 	 4.65 	 0.09 0.22
0.5 205.35 0.15 	 3821 	 5.37 	 0.10 0.25
0.6 85.34 0.06 	 1634 	 5.22 	 0.10 0.16
0.7 94.45 0.07 	 1634 	 5.78 	 0.11 0.18
0.8 84.35 0.06 	 1380 	 6.11 	 0.12 0.18
0.9 73.35 0.05 	 1109 	 6.61 	 0.13 0.18
1.0 73.49 0.05 	 1044 	 7.04 	 0.14 0.19
SUM: 1382.39 1 	 51.97 	 1
NOTE: ALPHA: WINNER'S CURSE COEFFICIENT
P: GAINED PROFITS
Vw: WON VOLUME
P/Vw: RATIO OF PROFIT TO WON VOLUME
W(P): UTILITY WEIGHT OF PROFIT
= PROFIT/SUM OF PROFIT
W(P/Vw): UTILITY WEIGHT OF P/Vw RATIO
=[ 	 (P/Vw) RATIO ]/[ SUM OF (P/Vw) RATIO ]
W: UTILITY FACTOR
= W(P) 	 + W(P/Vw)
Table 4: Analysis of Winner's Curse Coefficient: a(Projects 67-130)
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ALPHA (WINNER'S CURSE CO.) VS PROFIT
Figure 11: α  (Winner's Curse) vs Gained Profit(Projects 67-130)
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ALPHA (WINNER'S CURSE) VS WON VOLUME
Figure 12: α  (Winner's Curse) vs Won Volume(Projects 67-130)
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ALPHA (WINNER'S CURSE) VS P/Vw RATIO
Figure 13: α  (Winner's Curse) vs P/Vw Ratio(Projects 67-130)
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ALPHA (WINNER'S CURSE) VS UTILITY W
Figure 14: α  (Winner's Curse) vs Utility(Projects 67-130)
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this set of data. The data was furnished by a northern California general contractor
during the period of 1965-1968. Coincidentally, Benjamin's bidding data was pro-
vided by the another contractor also located in northern California during the same
period of time [3]. Therefore, it is logical to assume the degree of the winner's curse,
encountered by these two contractors, was not different due to the same location
and same period of time. Therefore, a 0.5 is used in the model computation.
Broemser performed a regression analysis on his data and found that the low bid
cost ratios (lowest bid/contractor's estimated cost) were distributed normally with
a mean of 1.021 and a standard deviation of 0.0518 [4]. Therefore, the standard
deviation of a lowest bid is equal to the product of 0.0518 and the contractor's
estimated cost. Performing the cost variance analysis similar to the method used
for Benjamin's data will determine the standard deviation of the costs among the
potential bidders.
The same model computation as used for the Benjamin's data was performed
in a microcomputer using Lotus 1-2-3 to obtain the following results: Table 5 (for
detail see appendix F):













No. of Jobs Won 7 4 11 12
Total Profit $478,100 $547,350 $589,400 $610,200
Volume Won $10,000,000 $7,635,500 $14,800,000 $15,500,000
Ratio of P/Vw (%) 4.78 7.17 3.98 3.93
The result shows that the proposed model out-performed Broemser's model in
the sense that it attained nearly the same profit level with only half the volume
of work and only a third as many projects. The model also has the one practical




It has been shown in this thesis that the game-theoretic model provides a better
understanding of the competitive bidding situation in which conflict among the
bidders is present. The simplified bidding model is useful in giving a more reliable
quantitative method for the decision making process. Since the business world is
very complex, further exploration in game theoretic bidding models is certainly
warranted.
A  Conclusions
Game theoretic bidding models provide a closer approximation of the actual com-
petitive bidding situations. In contrast to the Bayesian Analysis, the game approach
takes into account the conflict of interest among the competing firms. The current
state of game theory offers wider fields of consideration in modeling the more com-
plex situations.
The perception that the game theoretic approach is much more complicated than
the Bayesian approach needs to be corrected. The differences in all the available
approaches depend mainly upon the assumptions made with respect to the actual
situation. A model is considered to be a good one if the assumptions simulate the
53
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actual conditions closely and the model outcomes are optimal so far as the objectives
are concerned. Game approach has the advantage in both these evaluation criteria.
The simplified game theoretic bidding strategy is proposed for application in the
construction industry. The model has been tested by real data and proved to be
quite acceptable. One advantage of the simplified model is the lack of complicated
computation which makes it easier to be implemented in day to day practice. Man-
ual calculations are sufficient for operating the model although a microcomputer
with an electronic spreadsheet software is more efficient.
There are evidences that the winner's curse exists in competitive bidding in the
construction industry. Under estimating or over estimating this factor would either
result in a loss to the contractor with a low biased cost estimate or weaken it's
competitiveness if the estimated cost is high biased. Empirical analysis is one of
the approaches to assess the degree of local winner's curse .
B Recommendations for Future Research
For any bidding models the cost distribution form is the crucial factor to be defined.
In order to simplify the bidding model proposed in this thesis, an assumption of
normal distribution was made. However, lognormal distribution seems to more
closely replicate the real distribution than the normal. Furthermore, for both the
normal and lognormal distribution, the possible negative value in the distributions
is unrealistic in the practice since there are no negative costs for a construction
project. One type of distribution that provides only a realistic range of values is
the truncated normal distribution. It can be single side truncated or both sides
truncated since there is neither a negative cost nor an infinite cost.
The empirical analysis for the assessment of competitors' behavior patterns re-
quires moving pattern adjustment. The market is changing, the competitors are
growing up over time. Simply using the "one shot" regression analysis can not
indicate the impact from the changes of opponents' behavior and the physical envi-
ronments. Markov Chain is a good approach to predicting and modeling changing
states, but it needs to be simplified for practical purposes.
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The complete game theoretic bidding formula consists of a rather complex dif-
ferential equation. Numerical method could be applied in order to calculate values
by the means of a computer. The computing method is worthy of being researched.
The firm's objective is a vital issue in game theoretic modeling. A firm usually
considers not only the short term profit of the operation but other corporate objec-
tives as well. How to define the utility of a firm is an area of great potential for the
improvement of game theoretic modeling.
Sub-optimization is a serious problem in business. Single bid bidding model has
a possibility that creates an optimal strategy for a "one shot" deal, but it may not
be optimal from the systematic and sequential point of view. Although the winner's
curse coefficient a in the proposed model has implicit consideration in sequential
optimization through empirical optimization in terms of the corporate utility, a
better understanding of the sequential bidding process is expected from a better
model.
Decision making in a competitive bidding process is a form of information pro-
cessing work. The more significant information the decision maker has, the better
the decision will be made. However, perfect information is costliest. The tradeoff
between the cost of information and the benefits derived from information should





Degree of winner's curse (0 - 1)
Profit
Bid price of it h bidder
Estimated cost of i th bidder
Number of bidders for a project
Bid price
Probability of winning with bid price B
Optimal bid function
Derivative of optimal bid function
Low bid (winning bid)
Low bid cost ratio (ratio of low bid to firm's cost estimate)
Cumulative probability function
Location parameter of population (i.e. Mean)
Spread parameter of a population (i.e.Variance)
r th order statistic
standardized value of x r, (=
Expected value of r th order statistic
Expected value of Zr;n
Variance of Zr,
Low bid among n bidders for a project
Low estimated cost among n bidders for a project
Estimated cost adjustment function for winner's curse
Cumulative probability function of standard normal distribution
Density function of standard normal distribution
Profit
Won volume of projects
Ratio of gained profit to won volume
Standard deviation of estimated costs for a project
Standard deviation of bid prices for a project
σLB: 	 Standard deviation of low bid prices in a specific group of projects
(e.g. a cost range)
W(P): 	 Utility weight of gained profit
W(P/Vw): 	 Utility weight of P/V ratio
W: 	 Utility factor [= w(p)+W(P/Vw)]
STD(COST): Standard deviation of estimated cost for a project
STD(LB): 	 σLB
V AR(LB : 	 σ2 LB
OPBID: 	 Optimal bid price
OPMO: 	 Optimal markup
Appendix B
MODEL CALCULATION FLOW
The model test computation performed on the two sets of bidding data (
Benjamin's and Broemser's) follows the Following notation and formula.
NOTATION:
number of bidders for a project
CO:	 Firm's estimated cost of a. project
LB: 	 lowest bid for a project (winning bid)
ST D( LB):
σ  LB: 	 standard deviation of the possible longest.
in a project
E < Z(1; n) >: 	 expected value of the first order statistic.
of a standard normal distribution.
It's value depends only on the value of n,
and can be obtained from appendix C.
VAR < Z(1; n) >: variance of the first order statistic
of a, standard normal distribution.
It's value depends only on the value of
and can he obtained from appendix C.
STD(COST):
standard deviation of the estimated costs
among the bidders in a project.
function value of n.
winner's curse coefficeient from empirical study
optimal bid computed b the model
optimal markup on the estimated cost
or in the another notation:
Appendix C
BENJAMIN'S DATA











FIRM' BID LOW BID
BO 	 LB
1 5 16.8 15.34 81.97 19.38 13.77
2 7 309.5 5.20 101.77 325.59 314.98
3 9 239.2 5.88 96.16 253.26 230.01
4 3 824.2 5.05 99.50 865.82 820.08
5 5 37.9 9.33 112.90 41.44 41.44
6 5 11.0 19.35 105.90 13.13 11.65
7 4 1377.7 7.99 99.15 1487.78 1365.99
8 5 218.7 4.33 103.72 228.17 226.84
9 8 147.6 5.56 98.83 155.81 145.87
10 5 391.1 7.06 104.43 418.71 408.43
11 9 689.1 4.25 97.37 718.39 670.98
12 6 851.2 4.53 97.51 889.76 830.01
13 5 298.2 5.05 102.37 313.26 305.27
14 4 214.4 5.03 96.03 225.18 205.89
15 6 556.2 4.54 108.30 581.45 581.45
16 6 236.9 6.54 101.30 252.39 239.98
17 6 272.5 3.94 96.58 283.24 263.18
18 6 303.3 7.81 98.86 326.99 299.84
19 13 365.9 3.76 94.01 379.66 343.98
20 5 417.9 4.90 99.05 438.38 413.93
21 11 802.2 5.13 90.57 843.35 726.55
22 7 1188.2 4.34 102.75 1239.77 1220.88
23 7 505.8 3.92 100.37 525.63 507.67
24 7 493.0 12.70 100.96 555.61 497.73
25 8 637.7 4.81 96.29 668.37 614.04
26 3 75.3 5.97 101.22 79.80 76.22
27 6 226.6 3.43 101.43 234.37 229.84
28 6 217.4 5.28 107.61 228.88 228.88
29 9 154.7 4.85 97.84 162.20 151.36
30 6 55.7 4.36 102.91 58.13 57.32
31 5 34.5 9.25 102.80 37.69 35.47
32 8 1066.5 5.37 97.40 1123.77 1038.77
33 ' 2 50.5 6.08 101.97 53.57 51.49
34 3 1246.8 5.50 103.46 1315.37 1289.94
35 ' 5 712.3 4.83 98.13 746.70 698.98
36 10 570.0 4.13 100.13 593.54 570.74
37 4 1307.5 4.97 103.17 1372.48 1348.95
38 7 169.3 3.61 101.84 175.41 172.42
39 4 22.9 12.71 118.18 25.81 25.81
40 6 1053.0 7.19 102.73 1128.71 1081.75
41 7 56.9 9.64 95.73 62.39 54.47
42 7 484.9 4.82 96.88 508.27 469.77
DATA ON CONTRACTOR'S BIDDING HISTORY
JOB
NUMBER






FIRM' BID LOW BID
BO 	 LB
43 6 529.9 -0.41 100.01 527.73 527.73
44 6 345.3 5.79 105.90 365.29 365.29
45 10 898.0 7.13 98.77 962.03 886.95
46 9 690.2 4.93 100.98 724.23 696.96
47 4 1043.6 4.99 100.61 1095.68 1049.97
48 5 1189.2 5.65 96.28 1256.39 1144.96
49 7 185.4 5.08 101.38 194.82 187.96
50 5 1219.4 4.42 88.73 1273.30 1081.97
51 6 437.2 3.94 102.07 454.43 446.25
52 6 127.4 6.89 101.21 136.18 128.94
53 4 10.6 14.00 107.46 12.08 11.39
54 6 319.3 4.93 102.63 335.04 327.70
55 8 956.9 5.26 103.35 1007.23 988.96
56 7 207.9 6.90 112.12 222.25 222.25
57 7 359.9 4.11 103.48 374.69 372.42
58 2 40.7 14.72 92.25 46.69 37.55
59 8 614.3 10.15 105.77 676.65 649.75
60 9 99.4 6.36 96.34 105.72 95.76
61 8 312.2 5.61 100.59 329.71 314.04
62 7 129.1 5.86 92.55 136.67 119.48
63 8 133.7 7.48 103.34 143.70 138.17
64 10 1232.7 7.75 95.30 1328.23 1174.76
65 4 87.4 10.79 92.61 96.83 80.94
66 7 122.2 5.89 106.29 129.40 129.40
67 5 1215.4 6.41 106.63 1293.31 1293.31
68 3 333.0 3.20 93.38 343.66 310.96
69 7 1572.0 5.32 97.56 1655.63 1533.64
70 7 1534.3 6.38 95.70 1632.19 1468.33
71 4 12.3 29.32 122.96 15.91 15.12
72 8 685.1 5.90 102.57 725.52 702.71
73 3 271.0 8.39 106.58 293.74 288.83
74 5 69.9 6.73 105.77 74.60 73.93
75 , 6 310.0 6.11 100.98 328.94 313.04
76 8 644.8 2.91 101.57 663.56 654.92
77 ' 2 33.5 18.61 137.68 39.73 39.73
78 5 137.3 4.66 98.98 143.70 135.90
79 5 199.3 4.07 98.82 207.41 196.95
80 6 38.5 6.01 106.11 40.81 40.81
81 6 489.3 3.95 97.94 508.63 479.22
82 4 417.4 6.75 93.16 445.57 388.85
83 8 409.7 5.25 100.38 431.21 411.26
84 7 6.7 17.02 93.18 7.84 6.24
DATA ON CONTRACTOR'S BIDDING HISTORY
JOB
NUMBER






FIRM' BID LOW BID
BO 	 LB
85 5 65.0 7.32 108.74 69.76 69.76
86 9 15.4 10.02 93.07 16.94 14.33
87 8 128.0 4.60 101.21 133.89 129.55
88 8 692.0 4.72 101.61 724.66 703.14
89 5 288.0 5.99 101.72 305.25 292.95
90 3 305.8 5.15 84.57 321.55 258.62
91 7 187.1 3.76 94.54 194.13 176.88
92 9 9.9 9.55 90.94 10.85 9.00
93 11 901.3 5.13 105.65 947.54 947.54
94 12 184.0 4.75 102.43 192.74 188.47
95 5 120.9 4.53 102.43 126.38 123.84
96 9 440.9 4.05 99.29 458.76 437.77
97 10 18.5 7.56 97.70 19.90 18.07
98 2 399.8 6.31 100.05 425.03 400.00
99 8 300.5 6.27 102.96 319.34 309.39
100 7 38.0 2.86 105.15 39.09 39.09
101 9 100.2 9.56 93.42 109.78 93.61
102 8 803.2 3.65 93.38 832.52 750.03
103 6 273.1 6.31 87.88 290.33 240.00
104 5 40.4 8.37 91.60 43.78 37.01
105 7 136.1 3.87 100.27 141.37 136.47
106 6 254.2 5.57 107.54 268.36 268.36
107 7 247.4 4.55 99.74 258.66 246.76
108 2 38.6 9.44 106.24 42.24 41.01
109 4 22.7 18.06 95.54 26.80 21.69
110 4 9.4 10.82 87.78 10.42 8.25
111 6 739.8 3.49 102.40 765.62 757.56
112 8 1230.0 2.30 98.56 1258.29 1212.29
113 10 227.5 4.29 93.46 237.26 212.62
114 9 899.5 7.14 99.33 963.72 893.47
115 7 236.6 6.25 104.38 251.39 246.96
116 5 172.2 4.83 95.62 180.52 164.66
117 4 5 1235.9 3.92 101.79 1284.35 1258.02
118 5 265.1 3.43 92.40 274.19 244.95
119 , 10 1501.1 5.10 96.39 1577.66 1446.91
120 8 2005.5 0.22 93.43 2009.91 1873.74
121 4 339.0 4.95 107.18 355.78 355.78
122 4 9.9 14.62 89.72 11.35 8.88
123 8 618.8 2.15 102.75 632.10 632.10
124 10 469.0 4.38 99.78 489.54 467.97
125 9 575.2 4.00 100.14 598.21 576.01
126 3 38.6 6.72 84.73 41.19 32.71
DATA ON CONTRACTOR'S BIDDING HISTORY
JOB
NUMBER




FIRM' BID LOW BID
CO($1000) MUO LBC(%) BO LB
127 5 420.7 4.25 106.72 438.58 438.58
128 7 1307.3 5.36 100.20 1377.37 1309.91
129 8 250.7 4.38 110.86 261.68 261.68
130 6 35.0 6.62 108.20 37.32 37.32
Appendix D
EMPIRICAL STUDY 1
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF EXPECTED LOWEST BID







10.6 11.39 Regression Output:
11.0 11.65 Constant 1.85
16.8 13.77 Std Err of Y Est 2.69
22.9 25.81 R Squared 0.99
34.5 35.47 No. of Observations 13.00
37.9 41.44 Degrees of Freedom 11.00
40.7 37.55
50.5 51.49 X Coefficient(s) 0.95





REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF EXPECTED LOWEST BID







122.2 129.4 Regression Output:
127.4 128.94 Constant 1.86
129.1 119.48 Std Err of Y Est 9.80
133.7 138.17 R Squared 0.99
147.6 145.87 No. of Observations 29.00
154.7 151.36 Degrees of Freedom 27.00
169.3 172.42
185.4 187.96 X Coefficient(s) 1.00





















REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF EXPECTED LOWEST BID








529.9 527.73 Regression Output:
556.2 581.45 Constant 22.66
570.0 570.74 Std Err of Y Est 28.31
614.3 649.75 R Squared 0.96
637.7 614.04 No. of Observations 14.00
689.1 670.98 Degrees of Freedom 12.00
690.2 696.96
712.3 698.98 X Coefficient(s) 0.96
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1053.0 1081.75 Regression Output:
1066.5 1038.77 Constant 14.88
1188.2 1220.88 Std Err of Y Est 60.16
1189.2 1144.96 R Squared 0.78
1219.4 1081.97 No. of Observations 10.00
1232.7 1174.76 Degrees of Freedom 8.00
1246.8 1289.94
1307.5 1348.95 X Coefficient(s) 0.98
1377.7 1365.99 Std Err of Coef. 0.18





1 2.69 -1.1630 0.4475 4.02 0.3133
2 9.80 -1.3522 0.3919 15.65 0.2089
3 9.80 -1.4850 0.3574 16.39 0.1567
4 28.31 -0.8463 0.5595 37.85 0.6267
5 2.69 -1.1630 0.4475 4.02 0.3133
6 2.69 -1.1630 0.4475 4.02 0.3133
7 60.16 -1.0290 0.4917 85.79 0.4178
8 9.80 -1.1630 0.4475 14.65 0.3133
9 9.80 -1.4236 0.3729 16.05 0.1790
10 9.80 -1.1630 0.4475 14.65 0.3133
11 28.31 -1.4850 0.3574 47.35 0.1567
12 28.31 -1.2672 0.4159 43.90 0.2507
13 9.80 -1.1630 0.4475 14.65 0.3133
14 9.80 -1.0290 0.4917 13.98 0.4178
15 28.31 -1.2672 0.4159 43.90 0.2507
16 9.80 -1.2672 0.4159 15.20 0.2507
17 9.80 -1.2672 0.4159 15.20 0.2507
18 9.80 -1.2672 0.4159 15.20 0.2507
19 9.80 -1.6680 0.3152 17.46 0.1044
20 9.80 -1.1630 0.4475 14.65 0.3133
21 28.31 -1.5864 0.3332 49.04 0.1253
22 60.16 -1.3522 0.3919 96.10 0.2089
23 28.31 -1.3522 0.3919 45.22 0.2089
24 9.80 -1.3522 0.3919 15.65 0.2089
25 28.31 -1.4236 0.3729 46.36 0.1790
26 2.69 -0.8463 0.5595 3.60 0.6267
27 9.80 -1.2672 0.4159 15.20 0.2507
28 9.80 -1.2672 0.4159 15.20 0.2507
29 9.80 -1.4850 0.3574 16.39 0.1567
30 2.69 -1.2672 0.4159 4.17 0.2507
31 2.69 -1.1630 0.4475 4.02 0.3133
32 60.16 -1.4236 0.3729 98.52 0.1790
33' 2.69 -0.5642 0.6817 3.26 1.2533
34 60.16 -0.8463 0.5595 80.43 0.6267
35' 28.31 -1.1630 0.4475 42.32 0.3133
36 28.31 -1.5388 0.3443 48.25 0.1393
37 60.16 -1.0290 0.4917 85.79 0.4178
38 9.80 -1.3522 0.3919 15.65 0.2089
39 2.69 -1.0290 0.4917 3.84 0.4178
40 60.16 -1.2672 0.4159 93.29 0.2507
41 2.69 -1.3522 0.3919 4.30 0.2089
42 9.80 -1.3522 0.3919 15.65 0.2089





43 28.31 -1.2672 0.4159 43.90 0.2507
44 9.80 -1.2672 0.4159 15.20 0.2507
45 28.31 -1.5388 0.3443 48.25 0.1393
46 28.31 -1.4850 0.3574 47.35 0.1567
47 60.16 -1.0290 0.4917 85.79 0.4178
48 60.16 -1.1630 0.4475 89.93 0.3133
49 9.80 -1.3522 0.3919 15.65 0.2089
50 60.16 -1.1630 0.4475 89.93 0.3133
51 9.80 -1.2672 0.4159 15.20 0.2507
52 9.80 -1.2672 0.4159 15.20 0.2507
53 2.69 -1.0290 0.4917 3.84 0.4178
54 9.80 -1.2672 0.4159 15.20 0.2507
55 28.31 -1.4236 0.3729 46.36 0.1790
56 9.80 -1.3522 0.3919 15.65 0.2089
57 9.80 -1.3522 0.3919 15.65 0.2089
58 2.69 -0.5642 0.6817 3.26 1.2533
59 28.31 -1.4236 0.3729 46.36 0.1790
60 2.69 -1.4850 0.3574 4.50 0.1567
61 9.80 -1.4236 0.3729 16.05 0.1790
62 9.80 -1.3522 0.3919 15.65 0.2089
63 9.80 -1.4236 0.3729 16.05 0.1790
64 60.16 -1.5388 0.3443 102.53 0.1393
65 2.69 -1.0290 0.4917 3.84 0.4178
66 9.80 -1.3522 0.3919 15.65 0.2089




OPMO OPBID PROFIT WIN VOL
INTUITIVE MODEL
PROFIT 	 WIN VOL
1 0.2142 20.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.0448 323.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3 0.0616 253.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 0.0482 863.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
5 0.0949 41.50 3.60 37.90 3.54 37.90
6 0.3271 14.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
7 0.0581 1457.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 0.0599 231.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
9 0.0969 161.90 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
10 0.0335 404.21 13.11 391.10 0.00 0.00
11 0.0618 731.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
12 0.0456 890.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
13 0.0440 311.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
14 0.0608 227.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
15 0.0698 595.02 38.82 556.20 25.25 556.20
16 0.0567 250.34 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
17 0.0493 285.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
18 0.0443 316.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
19 0.0448 382.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
20 0.0314 431.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
21 0.0562 847.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
22 0.0716 1273.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
23 0.0791 545.82 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
24 0.0281 506.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
25 0.0648 679.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
26 0.0501 79.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
27 0.0593 240.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
28 0.0618 230.84 13.44 217.40 11.48 217.40
29 0.0953 169.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
30 0.0662 59.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
31 0.1043 38.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
32 0.0823 1154.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
33 , 	 0.0991 55.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
34 0.0677 1331.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
35 ' 	 0.0532 750.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
36 0.0769 613.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
37 0.0612 1387.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
38 0.0818 183.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
39 0.1562 26.48 3.58 22.90 2.91 22.90
40 0.0783 1135.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
41 0.0668 60.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
42 0.0286 498.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RESULTS OF GAME AND INTUITIVE MODEL
JOB 	 GAME MODEL
NUMBER 	 OPMO 	 OPBID PROFIT WIN VOL
INTUITIVE MODEL
PROFIT 	 WIN VOL
43 0.0733 568.72 0.00 0.00 -2.17 529.90
44 0.0389 358.74 13.44 345.30 19.99 345.30
45 0.0488 941.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
46 0.0617 732.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
47 0.0766 1123.58 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
48 0.0677 1269.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
49 0.0747 199.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
50 0.0660 1299.87 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
51 0.0307 450.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
52 0.1055 140.84 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
53 0.3374 14.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
54 0.0421 332.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
55 0.0432 998.20 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
56 0.0666 221.75 13.85 207.90 14.35 207.90
57 0.0385 373.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
58 0.1229 45.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
59 0.0672 655.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
60 0.0407 103.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
61 0.0458 326.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
62 0.1073 142.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
63 0.1069 148.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
64 0.0756 1325.86 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
65 0.0409 90.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
66 0.1134 136.05 0.00 0.00 7.20 122.20
0(== 0.5000 TOTAL: 99.83 1778.70 82.54 2039.70
1.0000 PROFIT/VOLUME = 0.0561 0.0405
COEFFICIENTS AND PARAMETERS CALCULATION
JOB
NUMBER STD(LB) E<Z (1:N) >VAR<Z1:N>STD(COST)
STD(BID)
W(N)
67 60.16 -1.1630 0.4475 89.93 0.3133
68 9.80 -0.8463 0.5595 13.10 0.6267
69 60.16 -1.3522 0.3919 96.10 0.2089
70 60.16 -1.3522 0.3919 96.10 0.2089
71 2.69 -1.0290 0.4917 3.84 0.4178
72 28.31 -1.4236 0.3729 46.36 0.1790
73 9.80 -0.8463 0.5595 13.10 0.6267
74 2.69 -1.1630 0.4475 4.02 0.3133
75 9.80 -1.2672 0.4159 15.20 0.2507
76 28.31 -1.4236 0.3729 46.36 0.1790
77 2.69 -0.5642 0.6817 3.26 1.2533
78 9.80 -1.1630 0.4475 14.65 0.3133
79 9.80 -1.1630 0.4475 14.65 0.3133
80 2.69 -1.2672 0.4159 4.17 0.2507
81 9.80 -1.2672 0.4159 15.20 0.2507
82 9.80 -1.0290 0.4917 13.98 0.4178
83 9.80 -1.4236 0.3729 16.05 0.1790
84 2.69 -1.3522 0.3919 4.30 0.2089
85 2.69 -1.1630 0.4475 4.02 0.3133
86 2.69 -1.4850 0.3574 4.50 0.1567
87 9.80 -1.4236 0.3729 16.05 0.1790
88 28.31 -1.4236 0.3729 46.36 0.1790
89 9.80 -1.1630 0.4475 14.65 0.3133
90 9.80 -0.8463 0.5595 13.10 0.6267
91 9.80 -1.3522 0.3919 15.65 0.2089
92 2.69 -1.4850 0.3574 4.50 0.1567
93 28.31 -1.5864 0.3332 49.04 0.1253
94 9.80 -1.6292 0.3236 17.23 0.1139
95 9.80 -1.1630 0.4475 14.65 0.3133
96 9.80 -1.4850 0.3574 16.39 0.1567
97 2.69 -1.5388 0.3443 4.58 0.1393
98 9.80 -0.5642 0.6817 11.87 1.2533
99 	 4 9.80 -1.4236 0.3729 16.05 0.1790
100 2.69 -1.3522 0.3919 4.30 0.2089
101 9.80 -1.4850 0.3574 16.39 0.1567
102 28.31 -1.4236 0.3729 46.36 0.1790
103 9.80 -1.2672 0.4159 15.20 0.2507
104 2.69 -1.1630 0.4475 4.02 0.3133
105 9.80 -1.3522 0.3919 15.65 0.2089
106 9.80 -1.2672 0.4159 15.20 0.2507
107 9.80 -1.3522 0.3919 15.65 0.2089
108 2.69 -0.5642 0.6817 3.26 1.2533





109 2.69 -1.0290 0.4917 3.84 0.4178
110 2.69 -1.0290 0.4917 3.84 0.4178
111 28.31 -1.2672 0.4159 43.90 0.2507
112 60.16 -1.4236 0.3729 98.52 0.1790
113 9.80 -1.5388 0.3443 16.70 0.1393
114 28.31 -1.4850 0.3574 47.35 0.1567
115 9.80 -1.3522 0.3919 15.65 0.2089
116 9.80 -1.1630 0.4475 14.65 0.3133
117 60.16 -1.1630 0.4475 89.93 0.3133
118 9.80 -1.1630 0.4475 14.65 0.3133
119 60.16 -1.5388 0.3443 102.53 0.1393
120 60.16 -1.4236 0.3729 98.52 0.1790
121 9.80 -1.0290 0.4917 13.98 0.4178
122 2.69 -1.0290 0.4917 3.84 0.4178
123 28.31 -1.4236 0.3729 46.36 0.1790
124 9.80 -1.5388 0.3443 16.70 0.1393
125 28.31 -1.4850 0.3574 47.35 0.1567
126 2.69 -0.8463 0.5595 3.60 0.6267
127 9.80 -1.1630 0.4475 14.65 0.3133
128 60.16 -1.3522 0.3919 96.10 0.2089
129 9.80 -1.4236 0.3729 16.05 0.1790
130 2.69 -1.2672 0.4159 4.17 0.2507




OPMO OPBID PROFIT WIN VOL
INTUITIVE MODEL
PROFIT 	 WIN VOL
67 0.0662 1295.87 80.47 1215.40 77.91 1215.40
68 0.0413 346.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
69 0.0541 1657.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
70 0.0554 1619.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
71 0.2908 15.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
72 0.0603 726.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
73 0.0508 284.75 13.75 271.00 0.00 0.00
74 0.0515 73.50 3.60 69.90 0.00 0.00
75 0.0433 323.44 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
76 0.0641 686.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
77 0.1493 38.50 5.00 33.50 6.23 33.50
78 0.0955 150.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
79 0.0658 212.41 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
80 0.0958 42.19 0.00 0.00 2.31 38.50
81 0.0275 502.74 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
82 0.0312 430.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
83 0.0349 424.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
84 0.5676 10.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
85 0.0554 68.60 3.60 65.00 4.76 65.00
86 0.2627 19.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
87 0.1117 142.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
88 0.0597 733.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
89 0.0455 301.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
90 0.0450 319.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
91 0.0740 200.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
92 0.4087 13.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
93 0.0500 946.35 45.05 901.30 46.24 901.30
94 0.0869 200.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
95 0.1084 134.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
96 0.0334 455.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
97 0.2252 22.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
98 0.0456 418.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
99 4 0.0476 314.80 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
100 0.1001 41.80 0.00 0.00 1.09 38.00
101 ' 0.1471 114.94 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
102 0.0514 844.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
103 0.0492 286.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
104 0.0891 44.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
105 0.1018 149.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
106 0.0529 267.64 13.44 254.20 14.16 254.20
107 0.0560 261.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
108 0.1296 43.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
RESULTS OF GAME AND INTUITIVE MODEL
JOB 	 GAME MODEL
NUMBER 	 OPMO 	 OPBID PROFIT WIN VOL
INTUITIVE MODEL
PROFIT 	 WIN VOL
109 0.1576 26.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
110 0.3805 12.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
111 0.0525 778.62 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
112 0.0714 1317.76 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
113 0.0667 242.68 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
114 0.0473 942.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
115 0.0586 250.45 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
116 0.0761 185.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
117 0.0651 1316.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
118 0.0494 278.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
119 0.0621 1594.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
120 0.0438 2093.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
121 0.0384 352.03 13.03 339.00 16.78 339.00
122 0.3613 13.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
123 0.0667 660.10 0.00 0.00 13.30 618.80
124 0.0324 484.18 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
125 0.0740 617.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
126 0.0978 42.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
127 0.0312 433.81 13.11 420.70 17.88 420.70
128 0.0651 1392.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
129 0.0570 265.00 14.30 250.70 10.98 250.70
130 0.1054 38.69 0.00 0.00 2.32 35.00
.= 0.5000 TOTAL: 205.35 3820.70 213.96 4210.10
1.0000 PROFIT/VOLUMN = 0.0537 0.0508
Appendix E
BROEMSER'S DATA
DATA ON CONTRACTOR'S BIDDING HISTORY
(BROEMSER'S DATA SET)
JOB NO. 	 NO. OF
BIDDERS
ESTIMATED LOWEST





1 5 3191.0 100.90 3219.72
2 8 380.9 99.93 380.63
3 4 288.9 91.11 263.22
4 10 1039.4 100.95 1049.27
5 4 1302.5 100.46 1308.49
6 11 659.4 102.18 673.77
7 12 1394.0 97.17 1354.55
8 4 1217.8 85.82 1045.12
9 8 239.9 101.43 243.33
10 6 98.8 102.96 101.72
11 9 270.9 95.91 259.82
12 9 2105.5 102.27 2153.29
13 8 676.7 103.32 699.17
14 8 1444.8 94.44 1364.47
15 7 1422.8 96.49 1372.86
16 13 3097.0 102.09 3161.73
17 10 829.5 103.37 857.45
18 2 559.3 102.38 572.61
19 7 2391.9 99.24 2373.72
20 5 4228.7 107.25 4535.28
21 10 5257.3 102.57 5392.41
22 10 1566.8 91.48 1433.31
23 10 81.6 89.25 72.83
24 8 1234.0 104.29 1286.94
25 9 129.0 96.58 124.59
26 7 115.3 91.38 105.36
27 11 1120.2 91.15 1021.06
28 3 2493.1 109.30 2724.96
29 10 1707.7 103.29 1763.88
30 7 925.8 106.44 985.42
31 9 503.7 99.03 498.81
32 10 824.6 110.80 913.66
33, 9 592.5 93.33 552.98
34 7 222.3 95.91 213.21
35, 6 3449.1 99.88 3444.96
36 8 2254.7 103.30 2329.11
37 14 1073.9 95.23 1022.67
38 4 1802.7 101.68 1832.99
39 6 1298.0 103.31 1340.96
40 4 3731.1 96.03 3582.98
41 7 789.4 106.46 840.40
42 4 1560.8 98.54 1538.01
DATA ON CONTRACTOR'S BIDDING HISTORY
(BROEMSER'S DATA SET)
JOB NO.	 NO. OF
BIDDERS
ESTIMATED LOWEST





43 5 223.3 100.43 224.26
44 5 233.4 102.42 239.05
45 9 89.1 110.93 98.84
46 5 155.6 100.25 155.99
47 9 3892.5 96.65 3762.10
48 7 405.6 97.42 395.14
49 10 493.3 86.70 427.69
50 4 1726.6 91.39 1577.94
51 6 2105.4 102.31 2154.03
52 5 3721.8 91.47 3404.33
53 4 2035.6 102.18 2079.98
54 4 207.4 105.30 218.39
55 5 150.7 96.57 145.53
56 5 168.6 103.10 173.83
57 7 140.2 86.04 120.63
58 5 137.1 101.19 138.73
59 6 822.0 101.15 831.45
60 8 2545.5 104.17 2651.65
61 7 655.8 99.36 651.60
62 4 575.7 103.85 597.86
63 5 1015.1 101.65 1031.85
64 3 224.1 99.53 223.05
65 7 1020.5 101.20 1032.75
66 4 310.8 102.51 318.60
67 6 250.0 105.48 263.70
68 5 1320.4 87.21 1151.52
69 6 1126.7 98.84 1113.63
70 3 2684.3 99.26 2664.44
71 6 2790.1 97.71 2726.21
72 5 237.6 97.52 231.71
73 7 1291.4 91.84 1186.02
74 10 1920.5 98.37 1889.20
75 7 3409.0 93.12 3174.46







1 165.29 -1.1630 0.4475 247.09 0.3133
2 19.73 -1.4236 0.3729 32.31 0.1790
3 14.97 -1.0290 0.4917 21.34 0.4178
4 53.84 -1.5388 0.3443 91.76 0.1393
5 67.47 -1.0290 0.4917 96.22 0.4178
6 34.16 -1.5864 0.3332 59.17 0.1253
7 72.21 -1.6292 0.3236 126.94 0.1139
8 63.08 -1.0290 0.4917 89.96 0.4178
9 12.43 -1.4236 0.3729 20.35 0.1790
10 5.12 -1.2672 0.4159 7.94 0.2507
11 14.03 -1.4850 0.3574 23.47 0.1567
12 109.06 -1.4850 0.3574 182.43 0.1567
13 35.05 -1.4236 0.3729 57.40 0.1790
14 74.84 -1.4236 0.3729 122.56 0.1790
15 73.70 -1.3522 0.3919 117.73 0.2089
16 160.42 -1.6680 0.3152 285.74 0.1044
17 42.97 -1.5388 0.3443 73.23 0.1393
18 28.97 -0.5642 0.6817 35.09 1.2533
19 123.90 -1.3522 0.3919 197.92 0.2089
20 219.05 -1.1630 0.4475 327.45 0.3133
21 272.33 -1.5388 0.3443 464.11 0.1393
22 81.16 -1.5388 0.3443 138.32 0.1393
23 4.23 -1.5388 0.3443 7.20 0.1393
24 63.92 -1.4236 0.3729 104.68 0.1790
25 6.68 -1.4850 0.3574 11.18 0.1567
26 5.97 -1.3522 0.3919 9.54 0.2089
27 58.03 -1.5864 0.3332 100.52 0.1253
28 129.14 -0.8463 0.5595 172.65 0.6267
29 88.46 -1.5388 0.3443 150.76 0.1393
30 47.96 -1.3522 0.3919 76.61 0.2089
31 26.09 -1.4850 0.3574 43.64 0.1567
32 42.71 -1.5388 0.3443 72.80 0.1393
33, 30.69 -1.4850 0.3574 51.34 0.1567
34 11.52 -1.3522 0.3919 18.39 0.2089
35, 178.66 -1.2672 0.4159 277.04 0.2507
36 116.79 -1.4236 0.3729 191.26 0.1790
37 55.63 -1.6680 0.3152 99.08 0.0964
38 93.38 -1.0290 0.4917 133.17 0.4178
39 67.24 -1.2672 0.4159 104.26 0.2507
40 193.27 -1.0290 0.4917 275.62 0.4178
41 40.89 -1.3522 0.3919 65.32 0.2089





43 11.57 -1.1630 0.4475 17.29 0.3133
44 12.09 -1.1630 0.4475 18.07 0.3133
45 4.62 -1.4850 0.3574 7.72 0.1567
46 8.06 -1.1630 0.4475 12.05 0.3133
47 201.63 -1.4850 0.3574 337.27 0.1567
48 21.01 -1.3522 0.3919 33.56 0.2089
49 25.55 -1.5388 0.3443 43.55 0.1393
50 89.44 -1.0290 0.4917 127.55 0.4178
51 109.06 -1.2672 0.4159 169.11 0.2507
52 192.79 -1.1630 0.4475 288.19 0.3133
53 105.44 -1.0290 0.4917 150.37 0.4178
54 10.74 -1.0290 0.4917 15.32 0.4178
55 7.81 -1.1630 0.4475 11.67 0.3133
56 8.73 -1.1630 0.4475 13.06 0.3133
57 7.26 -1.3522 0.3919 11.60 0.2089
58 7.10 -1.1630 0.4475 10.62 0.3133
59 42.58 -1.2672 0.4159 66.02 0.2507
60 131.86 -1.4236 0.3729 215.93 0.1790
61 33.97 -1.3522 0.3919 54.26 0.2089
62 29.82 -1.0290 0.4917 42.53 0.4178
63 52.58 -1.1630 0.4475 78.60 0.3133
64 11.61 -0.8463 0.5595 15.52 0.6267
65 52.86 -1.3522 0.3919 84.44 0.2089
66 16.10 -1.0290 0.4917 22.96 0.4178
67 12.95 -1.2672 0.4159 20.08 0.2507
68 68.40 -1.1630 0.4475 102.24 0.3133
69 58.36 -1.2672 0.4159 90.50 0.2507
70 139.05 -0.8463 0.5595 185.89 0.6267
71 144.53 -1.2672 0.4159 224.11 0.2507
72 12.31 -1.1630 0.4475 18.40 0.3133
73 66.89 -1.3522 0.3919 106.86 0.2089
74 99.48 -1.5388 0.3443 169.54 0.1393
75, 176.59 -1.3522 0.3919 282.08 0.2089
76 65.15 -1.2672 0.4159 101.02 0.2507
RESULTS OF GAME MODEL
JOB NO.
OPMO OPBID PROFIT WIN VOL
1 0.0693 3412.11 0.00 0.00
2 0.0756 409.68 0.00 0.00
3 0.0689 308.80 0.00 0.00
4 0.0802 1122.78 0.00 0.00
5 0.0689 1392.20 0.00 0.00
6 0.0824 713.75 0.00 0.00
7 0.0846 1511.87 0.00 0.00
8 0.0689 1301.67 0.00 0.00
9 0.0756 258.03 0.00 0.00
10 0.0710 105.82 0.00 0.00
11 0.0779 292.01 0.00 0.00
12 0.0779 2269.54 0.00 0.00
13 0.0756 727.84 0.00 0.00
14 0.0756 1553.98 0.00 0.00
15 0.0732 1526.99 0.00 0.00
16 0.0866 3365.15 0.00 0.00
17 0.0802 896.04 0.00 0.00
18 0.0963 613.18 0.00 0.00
19 0.0732 2567.05 0.00 0.00
20 0.0693 4521.71 293.01 4228.70
21 0.0802 5679.02 0.00 0.00
22 0.0802 1692.48 0.00 0.00
23 0.0802 88.15 0.00 0.00
24 0.0756 1327.25 0.00 0.00
25 0.0779 139.05 0.00 0.00
26 0.0732 123.74 0.00 0.00
27 0.0824 1212.54 0.00 0.00
28 0.0727 2674.35 181.25 2493.10
29 0.0802 1844.68 0.00 0.00
30 0.0732 993.59 0.00 0.00
31 0.0779 542.94 0.00 0.00
32 0.0802 890.75 66.15 824.60
334 0.0779 638.66 0.00 0.00
34 0.0732 238.58 0.00 0.00
35' 0.0710 3694.08 0.00 0.00
36 0.0756 2425.08 0.00 0.00
37 0.0858 1166.09 0.00 0.00
38 0.0689 1926.85 0.00 0.00
39 0.0710 1390.19 0.00 0.00
40 0.0689 3988.06 0.00 0.00
41 0.0732 847.21 0.00 0.00
42 0.0689 1668.29 0.00 0.00
RESULTS OF GAME MODEL
JOB NO.
OPMO OPBID PROFIT WIN VOL
43 0.0693 238.77 0.00 0.00
44 0.0693 249.57 0.00 0.00
45 0.0779 96.04 6.94 89.10
46 0.0693 166.38 0.00 0.00
47 0.0779 4195.76 0.00 0.00
48 0.0732 435.30 0.00 0.00
49 0.0802 532.87 0.00 0.00
50 0.0689 1845.51 0.00 0.00
51 0.0710 2254.94 0.00 0.00
52 0.0693 3979.69 0.00 0.00
53 0.0689 2175.79 0.00 0.00
54 0.0689 221.68 0.00 0.00
55 0.0693 161.14 0.00 0.00
56 0.0693 180.28 0.00 0.00
57 0.0732 150.47 0.00 0.00
58 0.0693 146.60 0.00 0.00
59 0.0710 880.38 0.00 0.00
60 0.0756 2737.86 0.00 0.00
61 0.0732 703.82 0.00 0.00
62 0.0689 615.35 0.00 0.00
63 0.0693 1085.44 0.00 0.00
64 0.0727 240.39 0.00 0.00
65 0.0732 1095.23 0.00 0.00
66 0.0689 332.20 0.00 0.00
67 0.0710 267.76 0.00 0.00
68 0.0693 1411.89 0.00 0.00
69 0.0710 1206.72 0.00 0.00
70 0.0727 2879.45 0.00 0.00
71 0.0710 2988.27 0.00 0.00
72 0.0693 254.06 0.00 0.00
73 0.0732 1385.97 0.00 0.00
74 0.0802 2074.55 0.00 0.00
75 0.0732 3658.63 0.00 0.00







EXPECTED VALUES AND VARIANCES OF FIRST ORDER STATISTICS
FROM STANDARD NORMAL POPULATION




















SOURCE: P. R. Krishnaiah, P. K. Sen
"Handbook of Statistics -- Nonparametric Methods"
Volume 4, North Holland, 1984
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